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AETNA V. DAVILA: ABSOLUTION FOR MANAGED
HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
When you go to the doctor seeking treatment for some ailment,
who do you think decides what treatment is necessary to remedy
your condition? Unquestionably, most people would answer that it is
the doctor's charge to treat his or her patients. Doctors are
meticulously trained to assess their patients' conditions and provide
the appropriate and required medical treatment. Furthermore, if
patients do not receive the correct treatment and are injured as a
result, medical malpractice liability acts as an important check on
physicians while protecting the patients' rights.
With this framework in mind, imagine a woman goes to the
hospital complaining of severe stomach pains. After a thorough
examination, the woman's physician recommends a treatment
regimen that includes an overnight hospital stay. However, when the
hospital calls the woman's insurance company to obtain approval for
the physician-recommended treatment, the insurance administrator
refuses to cover the hospital stay. The woman, unable to
immediately pay out-of-pocket for her clinically indicated treatment,
is forced to go home where she suffers severe complications.
What is the woman's remedy? A medical malpractice claim
against her physician would be ineffective because her doctor did
nothing wrong. Who is to blame for the woman's avoidable pain and
suffering? Her health insurance company refused her doctor-
prescribed treatment. If the company's refusal was negligent, should
it be held liable? Although holding the company liable for injuries
resulting from its unqualified assessment of what treatment is
medically necessary seems like the logical, just conclusion, the
United States Supreme Court recently ruled that health insurance
companies in these situations are effectively exempt from any tort
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liability. I
In Aetna v. Davila,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
state claims against a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) for
injuries resulting from the HMO's allegedly negligent denial of
benefits were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act 3 (ERISA). Specifically, the Court unanimously
ruled that patients who receive their health care through an
employer-sponsored ERISA health plan cannot sue their HMOs
under state law for injuries resulting from their HMOs'
administrative treatment decisions.4
In so ruling, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and
thereby crushed patient bill of rights laws in Texas and nine other
states.5 At issue was whether HMOs should be subject to medical
malpractice rules if they make medical judgments about the quality
of medical care when determining health care coverage.6 The
Supreme Court answered with a resounding no, marking a major
victory for health insurers. 7 As a result, if an HMO negligently
denies or delays a patient's physician-recommended treatment, it
appears that the patient cannot sue the HMO for injuries caused by
its negligence. Rather, the patient can only recover severely limited
ERISA remedies: the cost of the denied benefit or injunctive relief.
8
This Comment will evaluate the Court's holding in Davila and
its implications on the vast majority of working Americans who
receive health coverage through their employers, and as a result,
through an ERISA-sponsored benefit plan. In addition, this
Comment will explain how the Supreme Court's recent decision
marks a reversion to pre-1995 expansive preemption, a shift that
effectively closed the door to lower courts' attempts to limit ERISA
1. Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
2. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
4. 542 U.S. at 204.
5. Patty Reinert, Court Ruling Favors HMOs; Patients Can't Seek
Damages at State Level, HOUSTON CHRON., June 22, 2004, at Al. The other
states affected are Arizona, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Washington and West Virginia. Id.
6. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 212-14.
7. Id. at 213-14; see Reinert, supra note 4.
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132; Davila, 542 U.S. at 214; see also infra Part I.B
(discussing ERISA remedies).
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preemption through the implied authority of a 1995 Supreme Court
decision, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.9 In particular, this Comment will
show how the current state of ERISA preemption has left millions of
patients without a complete remedy because of limited access to the
courts under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.
Part II relays the history behind ERISA's enactment and its
subsequent application. Part III describes the background of the
instant case, and Part IV reviews the reasoning the Court employed
to reach its current holding. The analysis of the Court's ruling and
its resulting implications are analyzed in Part V.
IX. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The history of ERISA is long and complicated. Congress
enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect employees' interests in their
retirement and pension benefits and to prevent benefit plan
administrators from having to comply with different state pension
laws and regulations.10 Although ERISA's primary purpose was to
regulate and guarantee the solvency of pension plans, the legislature
expanded ERISA's scope to provide federal oversight of numerous
employer-sponsored fringe benefit plans, including health coverage
plans.1" As a result, ERISA now regulates both pension and welfare
plans.
A. Managed Care and Medical Necessity
In 1974, HMOs were not as prevalent as they are today; 12 the
legislature simply could not have anticipated the far reaching
application ERISA now commands three decades later. Today, over
9. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
10. J. Keith Pollette, ERISA Preemption of "Mixed Eligibility and
Treatment Decisions" by HMOs, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 393, 394 (2003).
11. See 120 CONG. REC. 31,065 (1974) (explaining that ERISA would
affect "defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, target benefit
plans.., and similar plans"). There are limited exceptions regarding the types
of employee benefit plans to which ERISA applies, e.g., church plans and
government-sponsored plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000).
12. See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and
How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 462
(2003) (explaining the transition from a "fee-for-service" system to the"managed care" system).
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130 million American workers are insured through a "managed care"
plan, which include HMOs. 13 Managed care plans operate through a
system whereby one company provides an insurance function and
also provides or arranges healthcare services. 14 Because managed
health care organizations receive fixed payments from customers,
their profits are therefore dependent on how much they can minimize
the cost of providing care.15 As a result, it is financially beneficial
for HMOs to limit what treatment they cover. 16
HMOs often limit coverage by evaluating physician-
recommended treatment and approving or denying coverage based
on what the HMO deems is medically necessary. 17 Services that are
not considered "medically necessary" can include treatment that is
experimental, investigational, cosmetic, or for the convenience of the
patient. 18 Such determinations, however, often reflect disagreements
between administrators and treating physicians as to the
appropriateness of choosing one treatment or medication over
another that is more expensive.19 Other cost-controlling measures
involve giving financial incentives to physicians by rewarding them
for decreased use of health-care services, such as recommended
hospital stays, and penalizing physicians for what the HMOs believe
is excessive treatment.20 HMOs first introduced these cost-cutting
techniques and coverage exclusions as a result of cost pressures that
also forced HMOs to make their own decisions about what treatment
was medically necessary rather than rely on physician
recommendations.
21
B. ERISA 's Preemptory Provisions:
Conflict and Complete Preemption
ERISA has broad preemptive effect over state-based causes of
13. David G. Savage, High Court Limits Right to Sue HMOs, L.A. TIMES,
June 22, 2004, at Al.
14. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 462.
15. Id. at463.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity,
Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 605 (2003).
19. See id.
20. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000).
21. Sage, supra note 18, at 605.
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action against an ERISA-sponsored HMO because the statute
provides specific federal remedies for violations of its provisions.
22
These remedies are embodied in two preemptory provisions: conflict
preemption and complete preemption.
1. Section 514 Conflict Preemption
Conventional conflict preemption principles require preemption
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 24 ERISA's express preemption provision is
defined in ERISA § 514. Section 514 mandates that ERISA's
welfare plan regulations "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan. 25 This provision supplants state laws that "relate to" or try to
regulate any employee benefit plan.26 The Supreme Court has
explained that a "law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan... if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan." 27 In addition,
§ 514 provides a federal law defense to state common law causes of
action that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.28
Under the above provision, a defendant HIMO that is sued in
state court under the provisions of an ERISA-sponsored benefit plan
may invoke preemption and have the claim dismissed. As a result, a
plaintiff's only course of action would be to sue under ERISA in
federal court seeking ERISA remedies.
The Supreme Court has explained that the ERISA preemption
provision reflects broad congressional intent to preempt all state laws
22. See Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208-10 (2004).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144(a) (2000).
24. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
26. See Pollette, supra note 10, at 395.
27. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
28. See id. Section 514 has one exception whereby federal preemption is
inapplicable: the "savings clause." Under this provision, claims that would
normally be preempted are "saved" if they are brought under state laws
regulating insurance, banking, or securities. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see
also infra Part IV.B (discussing why the savings clause is inapplicable to the
instant case).
August 20061
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in connection with or reference to ERISA plans.29 In fact, federal
courts have historically found that "ERISA preemption extends to
state law civil actions against... managed care entities if the
claim.., arises from a coverage determination even if the
determination.., was based on a finding that recommended
treatment [was] not medically necessary," with very limited
exceptions.
30
2. Section 502(a) Complete Preemption
Unlike conflict preemption, complete preemption "is less a
principle of substantive preemption than it is a rule of federal
jurisdiction."3 1 The complete-preemption doctrine applies when "the
pre-emptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts
an ordinary state ... complaint into [a federal] one."' 32  Section
502(a)(1)(B) specifies that a "civil action may be brought (1) by a
participant or beneficiary" to an ERISA-regulated plan "to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan." 33 As a result, § 502(a) provides for
federal jurisdiction over claims brought under ERISA and limits the
remedies for such claims.
To enforce removal under § 502(a), the state civil action must be
one over which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction. 34 Accordingly, there must be diversity jurisdiction, or
the claim must be within "federal question" jurisdiction, i.e., a claim
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
29. Karen A. Jordan, Recent Modifications to the Preemption Doctrine &
Their Impact on State HMO Liability Laws, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 51, 63
(2004); see, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 (holding that state laws requiring benefits
to be provided to employees disabled by pregnancy were "related to" employee
benefit plans under ERISA because they had a connection with, or reference
to, such plans).
30. Jordan, supra note 29, at 53 n.2. Cf Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211
(2000) (holding that decisions involving both eligibility and treatment do not
give rise to ERISA claims).
31. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir. 1998).
32. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (citing Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
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States." 35 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question
jurisdiction exists only where an issue of federal law appears on the
face of the complaint.
Federal preemption is applicable as a federal defense to a
plaintiffs state-law cause of action.37 However, federal preemption
does not actually appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint;
therefore, it does not authorize removal to federal court.31 Yet, if
Congress so completely preempts a particular area, then any state
complaint within this specific area is "necessarily federal in
character."
39
The Court has concluded that Congress "clearly manifested an
intent to make causes of action within the scope of' § 502(a)'s civil
enforcement provisions removable to federal court.40 However,
ERISA preemption under § 502(a) is an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule.4' In other words, when a state-law claim
"'comes within the scope of [an exclusively] federal cause of action',
it... 'arises under federal law,' and is completely preempted. ' ' 2
Applied to § 502(a), this means that if a state law cause of action
seeks to vindicate rights already protected under § 502(a), the Court
will consider the claim a federal claim and that claim will thus serve
as a basis for "arising under" subject matter jurisdiction.43
Therefore, a state law cause of action arises under federal law and is
removable to federal court if "(1) the cause of action is based on a
state law that is preempted by ERISA, and (2) the cause of action is
'within the scope of" § 502(a)'s civil enforcement provisions.44
C. Effects of ERISA Preemption
ERISA's preemption provisions require removal of a claim
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
36. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983).
37. See id. at 12.
38. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
39. Id. at 63-64.
40. Id. at 66.
41. See id. at 66-67.
42. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2003)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)).
43. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2003).
44. Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1996).
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brought by an employee under an ERISA-covered plan.45 ERISA
further limits the monetary remedies available for such claims to
recovery of the cost of the denied benefit.46 Accordingly, a patient
who has suffered injury as a result of a denied benefit may only
recover the cost of the denied benefit or secure injunctive relief that
forces the HMO to cover the disputed benefit.47 However, the
patient is not entitled to any compensatory or punitive damages.48
The effect of this provision is severe. Consider the following
illustration: Patient A's doctor prescribes a specific pain reliever
known to have more mild side effects than its leading generic
counterpart. However, Patient A's HMO refuses to cover the
prescribed medication because it decides that the prescribed
medication is not medically necessary. Patient A, unable to pay for
the prescribed medication out-of-pocket, or wait to bring suit and
force his HMO to cover the medication, accepts the covered generic
medication. As a result, he suffers severe intestinal bleeding and a
heart attack. If Patient A feels his HMO's negligent denial of
benefits proximately caused his injuries, Patient A's only recourse is
to sue under ERISA § 502(a) and seek one of two remedies: (i) the
amount of money it would have cost the HMO to cover the
prescribed medication in the first instance, or (ii) an injunction
requiring the HMO to now cover the prescribed medication.49
However, § 502 does not permit Patient A to sue the HMO to recover
for the pain and suffering or medical expenses resulting from his
internal bleeding and heart attack, circumstances arguably caused by
the HMO's negligent denial of benefits.
50
Because of circumstances such as those illustrated in the above
hypothetical, some have sharply criticized ERISA's sweeping
preemption provisions for insulating managed care organizations
from liability. 5' Under the Supreme Court's interpretation, ERISA
creates incentives for HMOs to "deny claims in bad faith or
45. See Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 66-67 (1987).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 53-54 (1987) (noting that the ERISA civil enforcement provisions
were carefully crafted to include certain remedies and exclude other remedies).
47. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 457-58 (Becker, J., concurring).
48. See id. at 458.
49. See29U.S.C. § 1132.
50. See DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 458.
51. See, e.g., id. at 457-59.
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otherwise 'stiff participants. 52  For example, because ERISA
preempts the state tort of bad-faith claim denial, 53 if an HEMO
wrongfully denies a participant's claim, the greatest cost it could face
is that of the denied procedure, the very cost it would have faced
initially.54 As a result, an HMO would conceivably pay more out of
pocket if it initially authorized coverage than it would by denying
claims up front.55 Furthermore, ERISA does not allow for punitive
damages, which might guard against such profiteering, thus creating
"a 'race to the bottom' in which, all else being equal, the most
profitable HMOs will be those that deny claims most frequently."
56
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the
breadth of ERISA preemption. 57 ERISA, therefore, continues to
insulate HMOs state law claims arising from an HMO's decision to
deny benefits under an ERISA-regulated benefit plan.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Aetna v. Davila began when respondents Juan Davila and Ruby
Calad brought suit against their respective HMOs, Aetna Health and
CIGNA Healthcare of Texas for alleged failures to exercise ordinary
care in the administration and handling of their health coverage
plans.58 Davila and Calad brought their claims under the Texas
Health Care Liability Act (THCLA),59 which imposed a statutory
duty on HMOs to exercise ordinary care when making health care
treatment decisions.60 The Act also held HMOs liable for damages
when patients suffered injury as a result of a HMO's negligent denial
of benefits.
61
Davila was a participant and Calad a beneficiary in an ERISA-
regulated employee benefit plan when they suffered their injuries.
62
52. Id. at 459.
53. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987).
54. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 459.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41; Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85
(1983).
58. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
59. TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-003 (Vernon 2005).
60. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204; TEx. CIrv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
88.002(a).
61. TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a).
62. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204.
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In Davila's case, pursuant to and agreement with his plan sponsor,
Aetna reviewed requests for coverage and paid health care
providers. 63  In Calad's case, CIGNA contracted with the plan
sponsor to make CIGNA responsible for plan benefits and coverage
decisions.64
Calad claimed her injuries arose after she "underwent a
hysterectomy with rectal, bladder, and vaginal repair" that was
performed by a CIGNA physician under her health plan. After the
procedure, Calad's surgeon recommended that she remain at the
hospital for an extended period to monitor her recovery.66 However,
against the doctor's recommendation, CIGNA's hospital discharge
nurse discharged Calad after a standard one-day hospital stay.
67
Furthermore, because the nurse concluded Calad did not meet the
plan's criteria for an extended stay, CIGNA denied her further
coverage for in-hospital recovery.
68
After Calad's discharge, she suffered post-surgery complications
that forced her to return to the emergency room.69  Calad
subsequently sued CIGNA in state court under the THCLA alleging
that: (i) CIGNA failed to use ordinary care and acted negligently
when it made its decision about what treatment was medically
necessary, and (ii) the way CIGNA administered its coverage made
substandard care more likely. 70 Essentially, Calad alleged that her
post-surgery complications would not have occurred if CIGNA had
approved her physician-recommended hospital stay.7'
Davila also suffered medical complications because his HMO
refused to cover his physician-recommended treatment. Davila's
physician prescribed a certain pain killer for his arthritis pain because
studies showed that this medication had less severe gastrointestinal
bleeding and ulceration side-effects than other arthritis pain
medications. 72 Aetna, however, required Davila to complete a "step
63. Id.
64. l
65. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002).
66. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
67. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302.
68. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
69. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302.
70. Id.
71. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
72. Roark, 307 F.3d at 303.
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program" in which he would have to first take two different
medications known for causing a higher incidence of such side-
effects before it would cover his prescribed medication. 73 If Davila
suffered a "detrimental reaction" or his condition "failed to improve"
after taking the "step program" medications, Aetna would then
consider covering Davila's physician-prescribed pain medication.
74
After three weeks on the "step program," Davila was rushed to
the emergency room, suffering from "bleeding ulcers, which caused
a near heart attack and internal bleeding." Davila's ailments
required extensive treatment and hospitalization, and he is now
unable to take any pain medication that is absorbed through the
76stomach.
Davila, like Calad, sued Aetna in state court under the
THCLA.77  Davila claimed that Aetna's refusal to cover his
recommended treatment violated its "duty to exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions" and that those refusals
proximately caused his injuries. 78 Davila and Calad's claims were
both state tort claims that attempted to recover under HMO medical
malpractice liability.79 However, Aetna and CIGNA removed the
cases to Federal District Court arguing that the state claims fit
"within the scope of' ERISA and were thus completely preempted
by the federal law.
80
According to the defendant HMOs, since both of the plaintiffs'
claims were based on wrongful or negligent denial of benefits (an
extended hospital stay with respect to Calad and received
medications with Davila) this seemed to fit squarely within a
§ 502(a) claim. 8 1 The district courts agreed and found that both
82claims were completely preempted under ERISA. Both claimants
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
78. Id. at 205.
79. Roark, 307 F.3d at 309.
80. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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court consolidated their claims.
83
The Fifth Circuit recognized that state causes of action that
duplicate or fall within the scope of an ERISA § 502(a) remedy are
preempted.84 However, the court found that because Davila and
Calad did not bring explicit ERISA claims, but rather tort claims
arising from their HMOs "mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions," 85 the claims were outside the scope of preemption
because they did not duplicate the causes of action outlined under
ERISA § 502(a).86
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA should not
preempt state malpractice laws or create a federal common law of
medical malpractice when a patient seeks compensation for injuries
resulting from an HMvO's mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.
87
The Fifth Circuit therefore remanded both claims to state court.
88
Aetna and Cigna appealed.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The primary issue before the Supreme Court in Davila was
whether Aetna and Cigna's removal of respondents' claims to federal
court was proper.89 To determine this, the Court examined whether
ERISA preempted state laws that provided alternate remedies for
patients under an ERISA-governed health plan when an HMO's
benefit decisions included assessing whether a physician's
recommended treatment was medically necessary.90 Reversing the
83. Id. at 205. The Fifth Circuit consolidated respondents' claims with two
other plaintiffs, Gwen Roark and Walter Thorn, who also sued their HMOs
under Texas state law. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302. However, the court ultimately
remanded Roark and Thorn's claims back to the district court. Id. at 311.
84. Roark, 307 F.3d at 305.
85. See infra Part IV.C (discussing mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions).
86. Davila, 542 U.S. at 206. The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Supreme
Court's ruling in Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, which held that
complete preemption is limited to situations where the state law duplicates
ERISA. Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002);
Roark, 307 F.3d at 310-11.
87. Roark, 307 F.3d at 311 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236-
37 (2000)).
88. Id.
89. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204.
90. Id. at 218-21.
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Fifth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that such state laws
were completely preempted by ERISA.9'
A. Complete Preemption under ERISA § 502 (a)(1)(B)
The Court began its analysis by assessing ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
to determine whether Davila's and Calad's causes of action fell
"within the scope of' ERISA preemption.92 The Court established
that
if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of
coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled
to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-
regulated employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty
(state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan terms
are violated, then the suit falls 'within the scope of' ERISA
502(a)(1)(B)... [and thus] the individual's cause of action
is completely preempted.
93
In an attempt to avoid preemption, Davila and Calad contended
that their HMOs' decisions violated legal duties that arose
independently of either ERISA or the terms of their employee benefit
plans. 94  Specifically, both claimants sued under the THCLA,
alleging that the petitioners "'controlled, influenced, participated in
and made decisions which affected the quality of the diagnosis, care,
and treatment provided' in a manner that violated 'the duty of
ordinary care set forth in §§ 88.001 and 88.002' of the THCLA.95
Nonetheless, the Court rejected this argument and found that the
duties imposed by the THCLA did not arise independently of ERISA
or the terms of the claimants' health care plans.
96
The Court reasoned as follows: Davila and Calad received
health coverage under ERISA-regulated benefit plans, and it was
only through their HMO's partial administration of these benefit
plans that each claimant had any connection whatsoever with their
IIOs.9 7 Accordingly, Davila and Calad's claims only concerned
91. Id. at 221.
92. Id. at 211.
93. Id. at 210.
94. Id. at 212.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 211 (highlighting Aetna's refusal to pay for Davila's Vioxx
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the HMOs' denial of coverage under an ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plan.9 8 The Court also pointed out that under the THCLA,
the petitioner HMOs would be liable only if they failed to provide
treatment that was covered by the respondents' benefit plans.
99
Therefore, the Court concluded that any liability under the THCLA
"derives entirely from the particular rights and obligations
established by the benefit plans."' 00  The respondents' THCLA
causes of action were inextricably dependent on the existence and
administration of an ERISA plan and thus subject to ERISA's federal
regulation, including preemption.1
01
Given that respondents only sought to recover from their
HMOs' alleged wrongful denial of benefits under their ERISA-
regulated plans, the Court held that their claims fell "within the scope
of' ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and were completely preempted. °2 In so
holding, the Court denounced the Fifth Circuit's contrary
conclusion. °3 First, the Court asserted that the Appellate Court's
finding that Davila and Calad asserted "a tort claim for tort
damages," as opposed to an ERISA "contract claim for contract
damages," was immaterial.' °4 The Court reasoned that hinging
preemption on the label of the claim would "'elevate form over
substance and allow parties to evade' the pre-emptive scope of
ERISA simply 'by relabeling their contract claims as claims for
tortious breach of contract.'' 10 5 Furthermore, the Court criticized the
Fifth Circuit's failure to apply ERISA preemption where the
respondents sought tort damages rather than ERISA remedies
prescription and CIGNA's refusal to cover Calad's hospital stay).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 213. The THCLA states that the duty to exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions, and the imposition of liability
for harm arising from failure to exercise such ordinary care, "create[s] no
obligation on the part of the health insurance carrier, health maintenance
organization, or other managed care entity to provide to an insured or enrollee
treatment which is not covered by the health care plan of the entity." TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(d) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added).
100. Davila, 542 U.S. at 213.
101. Id. at 212-14.
102. Id. at 214.
103. Id. (holding that respondents' claims were removable to federal district
court).
104. Id. (citing Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2002)).
105. Id.
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because Supreme Court precedent clearly upheld ERISA preemption
for claims seeking remedies beyond those provided for under
ERISA.
106
Second, the Court rebuffed the Fifth Circuit's alternate
assessment that the labels of respondents' claims were immaterial
because the claims asserted an "external, statutorily imposed duty of
care. 1 °7  The Court referred to its previous assessment that the
THCLA did not create duties external to those under ERISA to
support its conclusion.'
0 8
B. Application of the Savings Clause under ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A)
The Court next tackled respondents' claim that the THCLA was
a law that regulated insurance and was thereby "saved" under ERISA
§ 514(b)(2)(A).' 0 9 Although recognizing the "savings clause" as a
means to save state law from ERISA preemption, the Court noted
that the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) reflected
congressional intent to create an exclusive federal remedy.
10
Accordingly, the Court found that a state law that could arguably be
characterized as "regulating insurance" will nonetheless be
preempted if it provides means to assert benefit claims separate or in
addition to ERISA's remedial scheme."' Given ERISA's
comprehensive remedial scheme and THCLA's extra remedial
provisions, the Court concluded that THCLA was not saved under
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A)."12
C. Fiduciary Duty and the Narrow Reading of Pegram v. Herdrich
The last issue the Court addressed was its holding in Pegram v.
106. Id. at 214-15; see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136
(1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987).
107. Davila, 542 U.S. at 215 (internal quotations omitted).
108. Id.; see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (detailing the
Court's analysis regarding ERISA independent duties).
109. Id. at 216-17. ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) states that "[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). For discussion of the "savings clause" see supra note
28.
110. Davila, 542 U.S. at 217.
111. Id. at217-18.
112. Id. at216-18.
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Herdrich regarding the fiduciary duties of HMOs under ERISA. 13
In Pegram, the Court outlined three different kinds of administrative
decisions that HMOs make throughout the treatment process: (i) pure
eligibility decisions that turn on the plan's coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for that condition's treatment, i.e.,
decisions strictly about whether a condition is covered;' 1 4 (ii)
decisions about how a patient's condition should be diagnosed and
treated, also called treatment decisions;"15 and (iii) mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions, or decisions that assess whether one
treatment option is so superior and necessary that a decision to
proceed with such a treatment would mean that it was medically
necessary.11 6  The Court concluded that "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions" were not "fiduciary decisions" under ERISA
and thus do not "relate to" an employee benefit plan.
117
The Court defined an ERISA fiduciary as "someone acting in
the capacity of manager, administrator, or financial adviser to a
'plan."' 1 18  Section 1109(a) of the United States Code imposes
liability for breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA.119 The Court in
Pegram explained that it did not believe Congress intended that
HMOs be treated as fiduciaries to the extent that they make mixed
eligibility treatment decisions.1 20 The Court reasoned that ERISA
attempted to regulate fiduciaries as they are regulated under common
law, i.e., as trustees, not as administrators that make for-profit health
care decisions that may not be in the patient's best interests.
1 21
In Pegram, the plaintiff's treating physician owned and
administered the plaintiffs HMO. 122 The physician discovered an
inflamed mass in the plaintiffs abdomen yet did not order an
ultrasound diagnostic procedure at a local hospital. 23 Instead, thephysician made the plaintiff wait eight days for an ultrasound to be
113. 530U.S. 211 (2000).
114. Id. at 228.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 229.
117. Id. at 237.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000); Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
120. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231.
121. Id. at 231-32.
122. Id. at 215.
123. Id.
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performed more than fifty miles away at a facility staffed by the
physician's HMO.124 However, before the eight days were over, the
plaintiff's appendix ruptured.125 Because of the unique situation in
Pegram, where the physicians covered by the HMO also owned and
administered the same, the HMO's necessary for-profit decisions
removed it from the realm of a fiduciary and thus precluded ERISA
preemption.
26
The Court in Davila consequently clarified and narrowed the
application of Pegram so that it applies only in those cases where a
patient's administering HMO is also run by his treating physicians.
127
In such situations, eligibility decisions are inextricably mixed with
treatment decisions 128 because of the inherent financial incentive to
provide treatment that may not be in the patient's best interest.
Based on this interpretation of Pegram, the Court found that because
Aetna and Cigna were not Davila or Calad's physicians, the benefit
determinations were pure eligibility decisions, 129 and thus Pegram
was inapplicable.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Davila marks a definitive blow
to patients' rights protection. The THCLA was one of more than ten
state laws that codified the right to hold HMOs accountable for
benefit determinations that are, in essence, medical decisions about
medically necessary treatment.1 30 Such state laws, all of which are
now invalid, were driven by common law precedents which, in turn,
were spurred by Congress' inaction in amending ERISA-inaction
that left millions of ERISA-sponsored patients without a complete
remedy.
Before 1995, "ERISA preemption was interpreted broadly,
essentially immunizing insurers from tort liability under state law
and shielding self-funded plans from state regulation." 131 However,
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 223-26.
127. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218 (2004).
128. Id. at 219-21; see Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-34 (2000).
129. Davila, 542 U.S. at 221.
130. Jordan, supra note 29, at 93.
131. Sage, supra note 18, at 614; see, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
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the Court later changed course and limited ERISA preemption,
giving state legislatures greater leeway to regulate health coverage
"unless and until" Congress stepped in and clearly defined the
boundary between state and federal law.' 32 Yet Congress did not
step in. Lower courts, equipped with implied Supreme Court
authority, continued to narrow the preemptive effect of ERISA as to
the increasingly prevalent HMOs.'33 This common law regulation
ended with the Court's holding in Davila, in which the Court
unmistakably reverted to its pre-1995 interpretation of ERISA
preemption.
A. Competing Preemption Interpretations:
What Did Congress Intend?
Strictly looking at the Court's preemption analysis, substantial
authority supports the broad holding in Davila. Generally, state law
can be preempted in two ways: (i) where Congress evidences an
intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is
preempted because there is effectively no room for state authority;'
34
and (ii) where Congress does not entirely occupy the field in
question, state law is nonetheless preempted if it conflicts with
federal law, 135 or stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
full purpose and objectives of Congress. 136
Before 1995, the Court found that ERISA engendered a broad
preemptive effect, citing the Act's House and Senate sponsors and
132. Sage, supra note 18, at 614; see, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)
(limiting ERISA preemption to those state laws that substantially affect
employee benefits plans and holding that courts should presume ERISA does
not preempt areas such as "general health care regulation, which historically
has been a matter of local concern .... ).
133. See, e.g.,Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding that a claim about the quality of a benefit received is not
preempted because it is "not a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) to 'recover benefits
due ... under the terms of [the] plan."'); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that a claim brought against a health care provider under the
state doctrine of respondeat superior was not preempted under ERISA); Sage,
supra note 18, at 614.
134. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
135. Id. at 204; see also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
136. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
[Vol. 39:2
MANAGED HEALTH CARE
the Act's express language. 137 However, the Court must review
ERISA's legislative intent alongside the context of ERISA's
enactment: in 1974, Congress could not have envisioned the
prominence and power managed care organizations wield today.
When placed in this perspective, the Court should recognize
ERISA's limitations and adopt a more restrictive application of its
crippling preemptive provisions.
1. Shifting from Sweeping Preemption to Make-Whole Relief
To decide whether a federal law preempts a state statute, a
court's task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal
statute at issue.138 Pre-1995, the Court unquestionably embraced a
sweeping construction of ERISA's congressional intent. For
example, the Court found that Congress intended that ERISA be the
"exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants" for
claims regarding improper processing and that state laws should not
impede Congressional purposes and objectives.' 39 Furthermore, the
Court held that ERISA implicated both complete and conflict
preemption. 140
To reach this conclusion, the Court in Shaw v. Delta Air Linesla1
examined ERISA's legislative history and cited to ERISA's House
and Senate sponsors, Representative Dent and Senator Williams.
42
Representative Dent asserted that ERISA's "crowning achievement"
was "the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans."' 143 Similarly, Senator Williams
emphasized:
[T]he substantive and enforcement provisions of the
conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply
in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local
137. See infra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
138. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
139. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
140. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987).
141. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85.
142. Id. at 99.
143. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974).
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governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the
force or effect of law.144
The Supreme Court's pre-1995 cases also broadly interpreted
the terms "relate to" in § 514(a) and "within the scope of" in
§ 502(a)(1)(B).145  The Court held that both terms embodied
expansive preemptive effect: a law "relates to" an employee benefit
plan if it has any connection with or reference to such a plan.1
46
Furthermore, a plaintiff's cause of action falls "within the scope" of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions if the claimant asserts
improper processing of a claim for benefits. 1
47
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor14 8 the Court
articulated the principle that ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) has such
"extraordinary pre-emptive power" that it "converts an ordinary state
common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes
of the well-pleaded complaint rule."'14 9 With the backdrop of the pre-
1995 holdings, the Court clearly established ERISA's extremely
broad preemptive effect.
In 1995, however, the Court decided New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 5 '
There, the Court limited ERISA preemption to state laws that
"directly, or indirectly but substantially, affect employee benefit
plans."' 51 This ruling signaled a change: liability could indeed be
imposed on managed care organizations.
Lower courts jumped on this authority to chip away at ERISA
preemption. 152  The courts used the vague standard articulated in
Travelers to react ad hoc to the rapid growth of managed care. 153 For
144. Id. at 29,933.
145. See Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 41, 52-54; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
146. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
147. Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 41, 52.
148. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
149. Id. at 65; see supra Part 1B.2 (discussing the removal principles of
section 502(a)(1)(B)).
150. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
151. Sage, supra note 18, at 615; see also N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995).
152. See Sage, supra note 18, at 615; see, e.g., In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d
1089 (Pa. 2001).
153. Sage, supra note 18, at 615.
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example, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,154 the Third Circuit held that
§ 502(a) did not preempt tort claims against an HMO arising from
the negligence of one of its physicians. 55 Particularly relevant, the
Dukes court could have reached the same result simply by finding
that the medical services provided by the defendant HMO were not
ERISA benefits subject to § 502(a) preemption. However, the court
pursued a different analytical path. The court determined that
because the HMO had provided benefits under the plaintiffs plan,
the plaintiff was not suing to recover any denied benefits, which was
the precise remedy provided for under § 502(a). 156 In other words,
§ 502(a) did not preempt the plaintiffs state tort claim because the
claim was based on the negligent administration of the benefits, not a
refusal to provide those benefits. The Dukes decision was important
because it opened the door for some liability against HMOs, albeit
not justified by reference to ERISA itself. Nonetheless, Dukes was a
start.
Pappas v. Asbel157 is also indicative of the post-1995 common
law response to the implied authority granted in Travelers. In
Pappas, the court held that a cross-complaint by a hospital against an
HMO for refusing to authorize a patient transfer to another facility
selected by the hospital's physicians was not preempted by
ERISA. 158 The court did not find that the HMO's refusal to approve
the patient's transfer to a facility where the care he needed was
available fell within the rubric of an employee benefit plan's
administration. 59 Rather, the court found that the claims against the
defendant HMO were based on negligence attributable to a "cost
containment protocol set by a for-profit organization... which is
aimed at conserving and increasing its profits, an intention
diametrically opposed to ERISA's general purpose of protecting the
rights of a plan's beneficiaries."'
160
154. 57 F.3d 350.
155. Id. at 351-52.
156. Id. at 356-57.
157. 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), affid, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998),
vacated, U.S. Healthcare Systems of Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S.
1241 (2000).
158. Id. at 717-18.
159. Id. at 717.
160. Id. at 716. Although this decision was ultimately vacated, the opinion
is nonetheless relevant to highlight the change in perspective initiated by
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Despite the efforts of the lower courts to secure more
encompassing relief for patients, Davila marks the beginning of a
new trend reverting back to pre-1995 sweeping preemptive authority.
Regrettably, alongside this regression, the Court has eviscerated
states' attempts to provide patients with make-whole relief.
2. Returning to Its Roots: Davila's Preemption Analysis
Davila embraces pre-1995 interpretations by holding that
Davila's and Calad's claims "relate[d] to" employee benefit plans
within the meaning of § 514(a) and fell "within the scope of" ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B). 161 In Davila, the Court referenced and adopted the
rationale cited from pre-1995 cases such as Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux162 and Metropolitan Life. 163  In addition, the Court re-
introduced the holding in Shaw that ERISA includes expansive
preemption provisions that are intended to ensure "that employee
benefit plan regulation would be 'exclusively a federal concern.
' 164
By concluding that Davila's and Calad's claims were "within
the scope" of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), the Court embraced the
complete preemption holding of Metropolitan Life. 16  Given that
Davila's and Calad's claims sought only to rectify wrongful denials
of coverage promised under ERISA-regulated employee benefit
plans, without any other ERISA-independent duty, the claims were
"within the scope" of ERISA and subject to removal. 166 The Court
in essence declared that state laws such as the THCLA were nothing
more than futile attempts by state legislatures to circumvent ERISA
preemption. 167 As a result, the Court slammed the door shut on
lower court attempts to restrict ERISA's preemptive effect.
The Fifth Circuit attempted to develop an arena for make-whole
relief by interpreting the Pegram holding to apply to claims such as
Travelers.
161. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004).
162. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
163. Davila, 542 U.S. at 207-08; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987).
164. Davila, 542 U.S. at 208 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
165. Id. at 209 (citing Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 55-56).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 212-13.
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those asserted by Davila and Calad. 16' The Fifth Circuit also tried to
evade § 502(a) preemption by distinguishing the essence of a
plaintiff s claims, that is, tort claims as opposed to breach of contract
claims which ERISA covers. 169 Yet Davila intercepted this sort of
reasoning, thereby halting lower court attempts to create a niche for
make-whole relief under an ERISA-sponsored plan.
170
3. ERISA Preemption and Today's Employee Welfare Plans
Although the Court's decision in Davila is arguably sound, its
rationale is questionable in at least two respects: (i) the Court
misinterprets Congress' underlying purpose in enacting ERISA; and
(ii) the Court fails to analyze the context under which ERISA
proponents promulgated the Act's provisions. The legislature did not
intend that ERISA apply to today's HMOs.
The legislative history evidences a congressional desire to create
a sweeping preemptive effect. 17' However, Congress enacted ERISA
to preempt state law regarding employee benefits to protect
employees' expectations and minimize the administrative burdens
for employers who provide benefit plans in more than one state.
172
The goal was to create uniform federal regulation for employers
providing such plans as opposed to numerous state-imposed laws.
173
By restricting numerous forms of liability under state law, Congress
eliminated a disincentive to provide employee benefit plans; the
intent was to streamline regulations to encourage employers to
sponsor such plans. 1
74
Under the Court's current interpretation of ERISA, HMOs are
immunized from non-ERISA liability when they deny an employee
coverage.175  This result does not conform to Congress'
administrative streamlining goal: permitting lawsuits against HMOs
168. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 216 (2000)).
169. Id. at 309.
170. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 214.
171. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
172. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 483-84.
173. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) ("With the preemption of the field,
we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.") (statement of Rep.
Dent).
174. Korobkin, supra note 11, at 484.
175. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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that contract with employers to provide health coverage to
employees would protect the employees' expectations under the
plan, not create additional administrative burdens for employers.
76
Thus, the Supreme Court's current preemption analysis has
incorrectly assessed the legislative intent behind ERISA's
preemption provisions.
Furthermore, the Court overlooks the fact that Congress could
not have anticipated or intended for ERISA to apply to today's
managed health care system. The legislature's main goal was a
national regulatory scheme for fringe benefits, that is, pension and
welfare plans. 177 Medical care plans were not a part of such welfare
plans at the time of ERISA's enactment. 17 8  Moreover, since
managed care organizations did not develop until the late 1980s and
did not gain full strength until the early 1990s, 179 Congress could not
have expected ERISA's sweeping effects to apply to modem
managed care. Nonetheless, the Court has ignored these arguments.
As a result, employees who receive their benefits through an ERISA-
regulated plan are left with cramped and inequitable relief because
they are only entitled recovery under ERISA's scant remedial
provisions.
B. The Possibility for an Alternate Remedy
Under ERISA 's Equitable Relief Provision
Before making their way to the Supreme Court, Davila and
Calad declined to amend their complaints to bring ERISA-specific
claims at the trial court level. 18 Nonetheless, Justice Thomas noted
at the end of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision that there
could have existed the possibility for some form of "make-whole"
relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) if the claimants had made such
amendments. 18 1 Justice Ginsburg further advanced this position in
176. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 484.
177. Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move
Towards Defederalizing Claims for Patient's Rights, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 529,
542 (2004); see also 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (referring to ERISA as
"private pension reform") (statement of Rep. Erlenbom).
178. See Schmall, supra note 177, at 542.
179. Id. at 535-36.
180. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 205 (2004).
181. Id. at 221 n.7. ERISA section 502(a)(3) states that a civil action may be
brought "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
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her concurring opinion.' 82
Justice Ginsburg stressed that some form of "make-whole" relief
was needed in light of the existing "regulatory vacuum" that has
resulted from the Court's encompassing interpretation of ERISA
preemption and its cramped construction of § 502(a)(3)'s "equitable
relief" provision: "'[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted
but very few federal substitutes are provided."' ' 8 3 She further urged
Congress and the Court to "'revisit what is an unjust and increasingly
tangled ERISA regime"' by reconsidering the availability of
consequential damages under ERISA § 502(a)(3).
184
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence echoed Third Circuit Judge
Becker's admonition of ERISA's preemptory effect in DiFelice v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare.I8 5 Judge Becker's position was that ERISA
§ 514(a) preempts state causes of action where a claimant seeks to
enforce ERISA-guaranteed rights even when § 502 provides no
substitute federal cause of action.i 8 6 This "regulatory vacuum" gives
beneficiaries little or no recourse for even the most egregious
violations because § 502 does not provide whole relief.1
8 7
The concurring opinions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in
Davila leave some hope for state causes of action. Ginsburg wrote
that Congress should revisit ERISA to ensure that the federal statute
provides "make-whole" relief.1 88 This means that although ERISA
does not provide for make-whole relief as currently constructed, such
relief should be available. "Make-whole" relief under ERISA itself
would obviate the need for state-created patient bill of rights laws.
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2003).
182. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
183. Id. (citing DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456-57 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
184. Id. at 222-23 (citing DiFelice, 346 U.S. at 453).
185. 346 F.3d 442.
186. Id. at 457.
187. Id. Judge Becker asserts that "ERISA's remedial scheme gives HMOs
every incentive to act in their own and not in their beneficiaries best interest
while simultaneously making it incredibly difficult for plan participants to
pursue what meager remedies they possess, a confounding result for a statute
whose original purpose was to protect employees." Id. at 459.
188. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222-24.
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Although the possibility of such a remedy is beyond the scope of this
comment, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence evidences that the option
merits evaluation.
C. Davila's Implications
1. Medical Malpractice Liability as a Deterrent Measure
Doctors and patients generally feel that health care plans should
be held responsible when they cause harm to patients by denying
them their physician's recommended treatments.1 89 On the other
hand, HMOs argue that holding managed care organizations liable
for such decisions would substantially raise the cost of health care.
19 °
Yet, recent statistics belie the HMOs' arguments.
Health care costs were increasing at double-digit increments in
late 2003.'9' Yet in Davila, CIGNA, Aetna, and the Justice
Department lawyers advised the Supreme Court that if respondents'
state claims were allowed, health care costs would skyrocket.
92
They further stressed that upholding preemption would keep health
care costs down and ensure that workers continue to receive
affordable health insurance through their jobs. 193  However,
insurance premiums rose 11% in 2001, 13% in 2002 and 14% in
2003, with employees bearing the costs through "out of pocket"
payments. 94 Thus, contrary to petitioners' claims, health care costs
were already "skyrocketing," and the workers themselves were
forced to absorb the burden. Clearly, Davila alone would not
forecast the future of employee health insurance.
The holding in Davila also shields HMOs under ERISA plans
from tort liability, but it does not extend that protection to physicians
and hospitals.195 The Supreme Court has ruled that ERISA does not
189. See Savage, supra note 13 (noting that the American Medical
Association and Families USA, a healthcare advocacy group, denounced
Davila's preemption of state claims as a "sad day for America's patients and
the physicians who care for them").
190. See id.
191. Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, U.S. Supreme Court
Will Hear Consolidated Case on ERISA's Impact on HMO Negligence Cases,
17 EMP. L. UPDATE 6 (2003).
192. See Reinert, supra note 5, at Al.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See generally Korobkin, supra note 12, at 479 (stating that the Court's
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preempt medical malpractice claims against physicians by patients
who are enrolled in ERISA-sponsored plans. 196  As such, if
physicians are employed under HMOs and they receive incentives to
cut costs, physicians would be liable for any injury resulting from
their negligence. This means that if a physician provides poor
quality care in an effort to benefit from cost-cutting HMO incentives,
the physician is still subject to medical malpractice liability.
197
Moreover, an HMO can be held vicariously liable for its physician's
negligence, just not its administrative decisions.'
98
The problem that the Supreme Court's broad preemption
analysis engenders, and what Davila solidifies, is that HMOs can
effectively hide behind their treating physicians to insulate
themselves from liability. Davila "insulates HMOs from any
responsibility for delaying or denying care that injures patients and
shifts responsibility unfairly to doctors."'199 For example, ERISA
allows HMOs to encourage their doctors to over-recommend
treatment in order to preempt physician-based negligence. Yet,
HMOs may also limit what they cover by deeming that the treatment
is not "medically necessary." The resulting situation leaves HMOs
without any serious liability and patients are left with the
shortcomings of the present state of the law. For most patients,
denial of coverage by their HMOs practically equates to no access to
coverage at all. For patients who cannot afford to pay for their
recommended treatment up front, or who need treatment
immediately, denial of coverage by their HMOs is not just about the
rulings indicate that ERISA shields HMOs but not physicians).
196. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 235-36 (2000).
197. See Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1145-
46 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding ERISA preemption inapplicable to state
malpractice claims against treating physicians even when those physicians
were employed by the HMO and received incentives for refraining from
ordering costly treatments).
198. See, e.g., Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (holding that "[t]ort actions that seek to hold defendant health
maintenance organizations vicariously liable for medical malpractice have
been held not to be pre-empted by ERISA"); Patemo v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp.
1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding no ERISA preemption of a tort action alleging
vicarious liability against a health plan because it did not involve the
administration of the plan). Accordingly, an HMO is still subject to liability,
albeit through an alternate route.
199. Raymund Flandez, HMOs Welcome Court Ruling, WASH. POST, June
22, 2004, at El.
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coverage, but about health risks as well.
Aetna and Cigna argued that their decisions not to cover Davila
and Calad's doctor-recommended treatment involved whether those
treatments were covered under the health plans, not whether the
patients should receive treatment.20 0  Accordingly, their decisions
were simply coverage decisions, not medical treatment decisions.
Yet this argument begs the question of what constitutes a covered
treatment. Health care policies grant HMOs wide discretion to
reserve the right to assess what is "medically necessary." 20' Yet
health care professionals generally view "not medically necessary" to
mean "not clinically indicated." 202 Thus, when an HMO decides that
a treatment is not medically necessary, it effectively determines that
the treatment is not clinically indicated. But why should a health
plan have the right to challenge a doctor's opinion as to what
treatment a patient's condition requires? It should not. Nonetheless,
when an HMO makes a determination about what treatment is
"medically necessary," the HMO is in fact making a medical
determination, not simply an administrative decision.
Because "medically necessary" determinations are often medical
treatment decisions, opponents of broad ERISA preemption argue
that such decisions should be treated as medical malpractice
203decisions. To hold otherwise would promote substandard
treatment. The purpose of medical malpractice is not only to provide
patients with make-whole relief, but also to act as a deterrent. "[A]
health plan is not a health plan, i.e., whatever process or person is
used to treat and care for patients, if it provides rights without
remedies. Simply put, rights without fair and just remedies is the
sine qua non of no accountability within any patient rights
200. See Brief for Petitioner Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc. at 6, Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (No. 03-83); Reply Brief for
Petitioner Aetna Health Inc. at 2-3, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200
(2004) (No. 02-1845).
201. See generally Sage, supra note 18, at 601-05 (discussing the varied
meanings of "medically necessary," and that "decisions about health care have
become responsibilities of the health plan or other system that also determines
coverage, and not merely of that system's constituent physicians").
202. Id. at 601.
203. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459-63 (3d Cir.
2003) (discussing at length the inequity of a broad interpretation of ERISA
preemption and arguing that the HMOs make medical rather than
administrative determinations when deciding on a patient's treatment).
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initiatives . ,,204
The Supreme Court acknowledged the need for a deterrent in the
form of medical malpractice liability in Pegram, stating: "in an
HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less
care, not more. The check on this influence.., is the professional
obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of
skill and judgment in the patient's interest."20 5 Yet the Court's
holding in Davila eviscerates the exact requirement it acknowledged
in Pegram by insulating HMOs from deterrent-motivated liability.
Consequently, even if the Court reevaluated ERISA § 502(a)(3) and
established some form of make-whole relief, that would still not
solve the problem: HMOs are better off denying coverage up front
and risking the few times they will be taken to court and forced to
atone for their negligence. ERISA thus engenders the substandard
care Judge Becker admonished; there is no deterrent for HMOs.
2. A Call to the Legislature
As the issue stands, HMOs "can escape all liability if they
instruct their doctors to recommend every possible treatment and
leave the real medical decisions to HMO administrators. 206
Legislators created ERISA in 1974, and only they can make clear
that they did not intend to preclude an HMO-that makes medical
decisions regarding health care and treatment-from being held
accountable for its decisions.20 7
To be fair, Congress has attempted to remedy the problem. In
early 2001 the House and Senate passed versions of a "patients' bill
of rights" that would have allowed patients nationwide to sue their
HMOs for medical malpractice.20 8 However, the legislation never
became law.209 One problem the legislature faces is the fear that
enacting a uniform federal regulation for HMOs would allow a
torrent of malpractice litigation into federal court, a realm
204. Miles J. Zaremski, Patients Rights and Accountability: Can There Exist
Rights Without Remedies in an American Legal and Legislative Framework?,
22 MED. & L. 429,450 (2003).
205. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000).
206. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).
207. Zaremski, supra note 204, at 450.
208. Reinert, supra note 5, at Al.
209. Id.
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traditionally viewed as exclusive to state law. 2 10 Nonetheless, just as
Justice Ginsberg acknowledges in her concurring opinion, the current
state of the matter is "an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA
regime" that beseeches Congressional intervention.2 11 Perhaps now,
given that Davila has definitively quashed any attempt to create
make-whole relief, Congress will step in. The legislature could
remedy the inherent flaws in the Supreme Court's ERISA
interpretation by either increasing the damages available under
ERISA itself or simply allowing state tort claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA as applicable to
employee benefit plans necessarily means that federal provisions
govern HMOs' decisions regarding whether benefits will be
extended to those who are covered under ERISA-regulated benefit
plans. The effect is far reaching. In general, primary care physicians
who negligently provide treatment are liable for malpractice.
2 12
Likewise, an HMO is vicariously liable for its physician's
negligence.2 13  However, if a patient's health plan is purchased
through her employer, whereby the employer and the HIMO contract
to provide coverage as a benefit to employment, the HMO is
insulated from any non-ERISA third-party beneficiary claims.
2 14
Because ERISA does not provide for tort liability, compensatory or
punitive damages, a patient cannot recover for injuries resulting from
a negligent denial of benefits. 2 15 These patients are thus left at a
disadvantage, without make-whole relief, solely because their health
care is provided through their employer and not independently.
210. See Sage, supra note 18, at 617-18. The Court has acknowledged this
problem. In Pegram, the Court held "mixed-eligibility treatment decisions"
did not implicate a fiduciary duty under ERISA and thus mandated that such
claims, which involve medical necessity determinations, be heard in state
court. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237. The Court acknowledged that to hold
otherwise would mean that federal courts would have to evaluate medical
malpractice claims in order to determine whether a plan violated its duties
under ERISA. See id. at 235-37.
211. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004).
212. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 458.
213. Id. at 458-59.
214. Id. at 459-61; see also Davilla, 542 U.S. 200.
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
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Davila is therefore not just about preemption under an extremely
complicated and powerful federal regulation, it is about health risks
and quality of care. Practically speaking, the Supreme Court's
holding in Davila has profound repercussions on American workers
and their families simply because they happen to receive their health
coverage through their employer.
Without deterrent-based liability, HMOs will continue to restrict
access to necessary medical treatment under the guise of "medically
necessary" limitations. These limitations are possible because
Davila declared that such decisions are pure eligibility decisions,
despite the fact that they are reached by assessing medical risks and
reevaluating a skilled physician's treatment recommendations.
The evolution of the Supreme Court's preemption interpretation
has left ERISA beneficiaries inadequately protected. As a result,
only Congress maintains the authority to remedy this increasingly
unfair regime. Congress must take immediate measures to protect
employees and their families from their HMOs often unqualified and
misplaced medical decisions.
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